Recently we have observed a significant increase in state-sponsored operations carried out by threat actors worldwide. APT34, Gamaredon, and Transparent Tribe are a few samples of the recently uncovered campaigns, the latter was spotted after four years of apparent inactivity.
We decided to analysed the activity of the group after noticing a tweet of the user “@spider_girl22” in February 28th 2020.
Unlike other APT groups using long and complex infection chains, the Kimsuky group leverages a shorter attack chain, but at the same time, we believe it is very effective in achieving a low detection rate.
The infection starts with a classic executable file with “scr” extension, an extension used by Windows to identify Screensaver artifacts. In the following table are reported some information about the sample.
|Brief Description||Scr file, initial loader|
Table 1: Information about initial loader with .scr extension
Upon execution, the malware writes a file named “<random_name>.tmp.db” inside the “%AppData%\Local\Temp” path through the usage of the Microsoft Utility “regsvr32.exe”.
Figure 2: Written file (AutoUpdate.dll) in the “%AppData%\Local\Temp” path
Despite the “.db” extension, the written file is actually a well formed DLL that acts as the second stage of the malware infection. Static information of DLL are shown below:
|Threat||Kimsuky second stage|
|Brief Description||DLL used by the Kimsuky group as second stage|
Table 2: AutoUpdate.dll Information
The dll is then copied into the folder “%AppData%\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Defender\” and it is renamed into “AutoUpdate.dll”.
The “AutoUpdate.dll” library then gains persistence by setting the following registry key “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\WindowsDefender”. The name and the path used by the attacker is absolutely tricky, because they reference to Windows Defender:
Figure 3: registry key set for persistence .
Furthermore, exploring the content of the folder “%AppData%\Local\Temp” path, we observed another temporary file created and immediately removed dubbed “<random_name>.tmp.bat”. By analyzing its contents, we noticed that it is used to delete the initial artifact (scr) and file itself.
Figure 4: Content of the bat script.
In order to hide the malicious operation and avoid raising suspicion, a legit document is created in the same folder containing the “.scr” file, the document is named “이력서 양식.hwp”. Translating its name from Korean to English language, is possible to obtain the “CV Form” string. The name and other information about the document are the following:
|Threat||Kimsuky legit document|
|Brief Description||Legit document used to divert attention on the malware in “hwp” extension|
Table 3: Information about legit document with “.hwp” extension
As implied by the file name (CV Form), the document contains a CV form with empty fields, as shown in the following figure.
Figure 6: Legit document overview
An interesting behaviour is the “explorer.exe” injection performed by the “AutoUpdate.dll” in order to avoid AVs detection. Digging in the malicious code, it is possible to see the methods used to perform this operation. First of all, the malware sets the right privileges, as reported in the following image.
Figure 7: Privilege set for the correct injection
Once obtained the necessary privileges, the malware is able to proceed with the injection. As described by the analysis published by elastic, the malware writes the path to its malicious DLL in the virtual address space of another process through the “VirtualAllocEx” function. In this case, the target process is “explorer.exe”, it ensures the remote process loads it by creating a remote thread inside it.
To perform these operations, first of all the malware needs to know the Process ID of the target, this is performed through the navigation of all processes tree. This task can be executed using the Tool Help Library Windows API family using CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(), Process32First(), and Process32Next() API. Then, the malware calls VirtualAllocEx() to allocate a space to write the path to the malicious DLL, then it calls WriteProcessMemory() to write the DLL path inside the allocated memory.
After that, the malware calls the CreateRemoteThread() API to link the thread newly created to the host process (explorer.exe). Parts of the described logic are shown in the below figure:
Figure 8: API used for injection
Two components are implanted in the “explorer.exe” process. In the following tables are presented some information about the two DLLs extracted.
|Brief Description||First injected DLL|
Table 4: Information about first DLLinjected in explorer.exe process
|Brief Description||Second injected DLL|
Table 5: Information about second DLL injected in explorer.exe process
Comparing the ssdeep of the two DLLs is possible to notice several overlaps between the two libraries, a circumstance that confirms a high “similarity” between them. Below are highlighted the different portions of the hash:
3072:AFSYAyju5JpkC7xfYZo9cPqvTV+ql4yFa+z * +K+H/kocFAnRG5R:AFJ0qC7xAZliT004+p * 0fkoe * RG5
There are tiny differences between the DLLs as shown below performing a simple binary diffing analysis.
Due to these differences between the two DLLs, we decided to continue the analysis on one of them. Digging into the DLL, we notice that every time a function has to be performed by the malware, it relies on a recurrent decryption routine, which decodes the strings containing the actual instruction and executes it. An example of the decryption routine is reported in the following figure on top right:
Figure 10: Decryption flow graph
Every 15 minutes, the malware contacts the C2 (suzuki.]datastore.]pe.]hu) and sends back the information about the compromised machine, as reported in the previous figure. In particular, three HTTP requests are made using different URLs paths and different User-Agent fields for each request. An example of the C2 registration is the following:
Figure 12: Network traffic performed by the malware
During our Threat Intelligence activities, we discovered a new malware implant compatible with the previous campaigns of Kimsuky APT actor. According to the ESTsecurity firm, the initial dropper contains two malicious resources embedding the malicious DLLs, however, in our sample there aren’t.
Despite these little differences, we can affirm with good confidence that the Threat Actor is Kimsuky due to strong similarities with the TTPs.
Technical details about the Kimsuki implant, including Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) and Yara rules, are reported in the analysis published by researchers at Cybaze-Yoroi
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